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ABSTRACT
Public and political discourse around the 2016 US Presidential
election constructed it as a time of crisis for America. Yet, while
over 80% of white evangelicals voted for Donald Trump, religion’s
role in this crisis has been marginalized. Analyzing Trump’s support
among premillennial dispensationalists, this article explores
connections between dispensationalist discourses of divine
providence and constructions of Trump’s election as a “turning
point” for America. Charting links between conﬂicts over domestic
cultural homogeneity and attempted impositions of US power over
global “deviants” (terrorists, rogue states), it argues that the crisis of
American identity ﬁgured by Trump’s election is tied to religious
and secularized soteriologies emerging from notions of American






“Can we become one America in the twenty-ﬁrst century?” Bill Clinton asked on 14 June
1997, announcing his new Initiative to realize the promise of a nation: “One America in
the Twenty-First Century: The President’s Initiative on Race.” Aimed at promoting dialo-
gue across racial and ethnic divides, the Initiative sought to heal the “problem of race” as
both the “oldest” and “newest” dilemma confronting the United States. By 2017, as the
presidency passed from Barack Obama not to Hillary Rodham Clinton – as predicted
by pollsters and pundits – but to Donald Trump, a candidate who campaigned on a plat-
form of open xenophobia and white racial ressentiment and whose political career had
been launched by the conspiracy that Obama was not truly American, the answer to Clin-
ton’s question might have appeared self-evident. However, rather than being a mere nega-
tion, Trump’s election might be considered an (unintended) consequence of this question
– for unspoken in the question is an assumption: that “one America,” a uniﬁed America, is
also one America, a speciﬁc or certain America.
In the move towards transcendence of its diﬀerences, this America diﬀerentiates itself.
Such diﬀerentiation divides the nation from its geopolitical others, as-yet-divided, and
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from its own history, imperfectly realized. More than this, it divides one America from com-
peting visions of its future – from Americas that will or should not be. Public discourse
around the 2016 election framed it as a choice between such Americas.1 Yet although
white evangelicals voted for Trump by a greater margin than in any election since 2004,
the relevance of religion has tended to be marginalized in favor of race, class, or gender.2
This article addresses this omission. Unpacking the theopolitics behind some of Trump’s
prominent evangelical supporters, it argues that the crisis of American identity seen as
embodied in the 2016 presidential election is tied to a broader crisis, religious and political,
inaugurated by the advent of geopolitical unipolarity at the end of the Cold War.3
This crisis is, I contend, oriented around anxieties over (more or less) secularized discourses
of salvation and damnation (soteriologies) rooted in systems of American exceptionalism and
empire management. To demonstrate this, I draw on the theological concept of the dispensa-
tion – common among Trump’s evangelical supporters.4 I unpack the “dispensation” as a
system of law and order that determines the means of salvation in a historical period, facilitat-
ing the creation of borders between “saved” and “damned” tied to ideas of national or imperial
belonging. Interrogating dispensationalist support for Trump alongside framings of Trump as
representing a “turning point” in US politics, I then argue that the “dispensation” can act as an
analytical tool for reframing the relationbetweendomestic and international politics. Juxtapos-
ing post-Cold War consolidations of American unipolarity against terrorists and rogue states
to domestic culture wars over the authentic identity of the nation, I contend that “the unipolar
moment” that marked America’s place as sole superpower symbolically inaugurated a “uni-
polar dispensation” in which “salvation” (for individuals and nation-states) became bound
to a capacity to approximate (if never completely embody) a uniﬁed “American” identity
that was itself ceaselessly contested. It is this broader framework of contestation and crisis
that, I argue, Trump’s election should be situated in: the crisis of “one America” – of the ques-
tion of and the quest for one America, and competing visions for what this America should be.
Citizens of paradise
For many of Trump’s prominent white evangelical supporters, his election represented a
speciﬁc vision for the nation’s future. “The Lord’s plan is being put in place for America,”
1On 6 November, for example, Domenico Montanaro of NPR situated the election in a context in which demographic and
cultural change were “straining the fabric of what it means to be American.” On election day, politics professor Samuel
Abrams asked in the New York Times if it was a “Political Turning Point” for the nation. Earlier, on 2 September, Molly Ball
of The Atlantic had framed the election through ideas of fear and identity, citing immigration advocate Frank Sharry’s
blunt assessment that 2016’s was “not a political campaign” but “an identity campaign.”
2I do not here intend to minimalize racial, sexual, gendered, or class-based reasons behind Trump support – these are
clearly important, as documented by Mutz (‘Status threat’) and Schaﬀner, MacWilliams, and Nteta (‘Understanding
White Polarization’).
3This article uses the common international relations theory periodization of “Cold War/post-Cold War,” while it is aware of
signiﬁcant problems with this periodization (see, for example, Park-Kung, Fictional International Relations, 141). I follow
Adib-Moghaddam in dating the formal start of “unipolarity” to the 1990–1991 Gulf War (International Politics, 75), and
Bacevich in conceptualizing the war on terror as fundamentally in continuity with (if still distinct from) existing US imper-
ial praxis, notably the pursuit of openness (American Empire) and the associated need to increase freedom through
endless expansion and extraction (Limits of Power).
4The strand of evangelicalism this article focuses on is premillennial dispensationalism, which represents an inﬂuential
strand of conservative evangelicalism and fundamentalism in America broadly. While the article recognizes that not
all the evangelicals who voted for Trump are dispensationalists, premillennial, or otherwise, many of his more prominent
or visible advocates (such as Falwell, Robertson, Lindsey, and Jeﬀress) hold premillennialist dispensationalist views. For
overviews of conservative evangelicalism in the US more broadly, and dispensationalism’s place within it, see Boyer,
When Time Shall Be; Lahr, Millennial Dreams; Sutton, American Apocalypse; Wojcik, End of the World.
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Pat Robertson informed his audience on the 15 February 2017 episode of The 700 Club.
Speaking after another leak to the press from inside the White House, Robertson situated
the actions of both renegade staﬀers and the press itself in a context of national and cosmic
rebellion: “these people are not only revolting against Trump,” he stated, “they’re revolting
against what God’s plan is for America.” The day after Trump’s inauguration, meanwhile,
Hal Lindsey drew parallels on HalLindsey.com between the election and the repentance of
Nineveh, which postponed the city’s “well-earned destruction.” At a private sermon for
the president-elect on the morning of his inauguration, Robert Jeﬀress, who is among
the president’s core evangelical advisors, compared Trump’s plan for a southern border
wall to the mission of Nehemiah: “Nehemiah wasn’t a politician, he wasn’t a prophet,
he was a builder,” he said on The Mike Gallagher Show that evening, “God told him to
build a wall around Jerusalem and he did that, and God made it a great success.”
“Who the Americans are”
Many of these ﬁgures share a theological worldview that became dominant in American
conservative Christianity since the nineteenth century: premillennialist dispensationalism.
Facilitated by the fusion of Christianity and nationalistic anticommunism in public and
political life during the Cold War, dispensationalism was popularized by evangelists
such as Billy Graham, Jerry Falwell, Sr., Robertson, and Lindsey.5 Attempts to categorize
the paradigm have often focused on its commitment to “biblical literalism,” its apocalyptic
orientation, and support for socially conservative causes, such as resistance to LGBT
rights, black civil rights, and reproductive rights.6 Public discussions of Trump’s appeal
for dispensationalists usually focus on the middle pillar: apocalypticism and dispensational
notions of history. For example, Tara Burton of Vox situates dispensationalist support for
Trump speciﬁcally in relation to the belief that political chaos advances the end times and
(thus) Christian victory.7 On 9 May 2016, months before the election, Dan Sinykin in the
LA Review of Books drew the connections even more starkly, juxtaposing the bestselling
dispensationalist Left Behind (1995–2007) novels by Tim LeHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins –
in which “Morally imperfect but virile leaders” bring hope to “a besieged people, sur-
rounded by chaos and decadence” and “guide the faithful to paradise” – with Trump sup-
porters’ cultural and economic anxieties and desire for leaders to alleviate them. For these
authors, Trump’s dispensationalist support is tied not necessarily to the content of reli-
gious claims or his own religious character, but rather to ideas of legitimate authority,
teleological progress, and theopolitical election.
As a theological concept, the dispensation amalgamates ideas of history, authority, and
salvation. Deriving from the Latin dispensatio, the term refers to a concept of salvation
history that sees time as divided into several epochs (dispensations) in which relations
between God and humanity are soteriologically distinct. In dispensationalism, two of
the most important dispensations are the dispensation of law (under which the Israelites
lived) and the current dispensation of grace (inaugurated by Christ). According to the
1909 Scoﬁeld Reference Bible, a comprehensive early dispensationalist text, during the
5Boyer, When Time Shall Be; Lahr, Millennial Dreams.
6Sweetnam, “Deﬁning Dispensationalism,” 198; Wojcik, End of the World, 34.
7See in particular her articles of 15 July 2017 (‘Trump coped with the Russia scandal by courting evangelicals. Here’s why
that’s worrisome’) and 12 December 2017 (‘#RaptureAnxiety calls out evangelicals’ toxic obsession with the end times’).
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dispensation of law the relation between God and humanity (or rather the Israelites) rested
on Mosaic Law, which functioned as “rule for living” and force of “disciplinary restriction
and correction… to hold Israel in check for their own good.”8 Meanwhile, dispensation-
alists hold that in the current dispensation of grace, this relation rests not on the law but on
faith: whereas salvation in the prior dispensation depended on adherence to divine law, it
is now the grace of and faith in God that are the means for achieving salvation. For pre-
millennialists, the current dispensation is projected to end with the rapture, when “true”
Christians are raised into heaven and the remainder of humanity is left behind to suﬀer
through Apocalypse. As such, predicting the rapture is often central to dispensationalist
prophesying, and the divisions it inaugurates between the already-saved and the poten-
tially savable, damned, and damnable are ones Sinykin sees reﬂected in the sociopolitical
imaginary of Trump’s more dispensationalist-inclined supporters. “When the rapture
comes, we will know who the Christians are,” he summarizes their worldview, and
“When Trump is elected…we will know who the Americans are.”
Sinykin’s phrasing, while mainly rhetorical, draws clear parallels between Trump’s
election (then considered an implausible, if not impossible, event) and the end of the
current dispensation – the instant of rupture when the means of salvation, previously
stable, irrevocably alter. Yet if Trump’s election – symbolically and politically, rather
than theologically – ends a prior soteriological order, what “dispensation” would this
be and what paradigm of “salvation” was (thereby) dispensed with (and relatedly,
begun)? In the rest of this article, I refer to this earlier era as the “unipolar dispensation”
– one inaugurated by the “unipolar moment” and (potentially) ended by Trump’s elec-
tion. In referring to these periods as “dispensations,” I do not mean that either is a dis-
pensation in the theological sense used by Scoﬁeld or contemporary dispensationalists,
but in the more symbolic sense implied by Sinykin. Trump’s election – much as his dis-
pensationalist followers might wish otherwise – is not literally the rapture. Nonetheless,
his election has represented a political shift in both US foreign relations – pithily if iro-
nically encapsulated by a 16 March 2017 Politico article announcing President Trump’s
meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel: “The Leader of the Free World Meets
Donald Trump” – and in domestic political norms, complicating progressive under-
standings of the arc of history. Viewed in relation to strong dispensationalist support
for Trump, the “dispensation” – as a prominent model of the historical shift in Amer-
ican evangelicalism – may serve as a useful heuristic for exploring tensions in American
politics, religion, and identity in both the Trump era and that which preceded it. As I
will argue, the “unipolar dispensation” served as a battleground over the means for
knowing “who the Americans are,” for identifying the saved from among the savable,
damned, and damnable – soteriological divides that Trump’s election both troubles
and reinforces.
The triptych
The concept of the dispensation, as Yvonne Sherwood outlines, is tied to questions of
sovereignty. It names both “a system of management (law and order) and the exception,”
describing “a system of management, regulation, and economy” dispensed (with) by the
8Scoﬁeld, Study Bible, 114.
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sovereign dispenser.9 The Latin term itself, dispensatio, commonly translates the Greek
oikonomia, “economy” in the etymological sense of household management. This sense
of economic regulation is not merely domestic or ﬁnancial, however. As Adam Kotsko
summarizes, while ﬁrst referring “to the management of the household,” over time oiko-
nomia also came to be associated “with the management of a culturally diverse empire”
and, in Christian theology, “with God’s providential management of his creation.”10
The sense of dispensation in dispensationalism inherits all three associations, coming to
reﬂect a triptych, a set of three associated works meant to be understood together. In
the dispensational triptych, images of household, empire, and cosmos form a uniﬁed
picture that is created and maintained by a sovereign dispenser. This dispenser keeps
each image coherent with the others – and ultimately dispenses with and replaces the trip-
tych entirely at the climax of each dispensation.
Imagining the dispensation as a household–empire–cosmos triptych elucidates the
links between dispensational cosmology and dispensationalist political and sociocultural
engagement. Ideas of “the household” are an illustrative example. Daniel Wojcik partly
categorizes dispensationalism through its support of conservative political causes, two
of the most central of which are opposition to LGBT rights and championing of a hetero-
patriarchal nuclear family.11 As Erin Runions demonstrates, in contemporary America,
the normative nature of the heteropatriarchal family is often legitimized through opposi-
tion to demonized others.12 Most common of such others are LGBT people and people
who have sex outside of wedlock (whose non-normative practices are ﬁgured as an
excess threatening the stability and perpetuation of the family) as well as foreigners
(seen as harbingers of threatening alien beliefs and practices, often sexual). Such opposi-
tion might seem more incidental than integral to dispensationalism, but the triptych
allows us to see images of the family – household – as intimately connected to cosmic
and national/imperial concerns. These links are made apparent in Jerry Falwell, Sr., and
Robertson’s now-infamous claim on The 700 Club two days after the 9/11 attacks that
they occurred because God had “lifted his veil of protection” from the nation due to its
tolerance of an “Unholy Trinity of feminists, civil libertarians and homosexuals.” While
publicly denounced, such statements are consistent with dispensationalist prophesying,13
and ﬁgure a worldview in which maintenance of American election and (thus) preemi-
nence depends on the maintenance of “proper” household relations, which become essen-
tial for both cosmic order and the national or imperial order that mediates between them.
The nation-state – or rather what social theorist Julian Go terms the “empire-state” –
constitutes the central image that mediates between household and cosmos. This imperial
image of the dispensation is integral for considerations of what I am terming the unipolar
dispensation, for – as I will elaborate – unipolarity’s providential economies are enmeshed
within notions of American exceptionalism and practices of American empire. Framing
the dispensation through the lens of empire reinforces how its soteriological economy
relies on the drawing of lines of diﬀerentiation between insiders and outsiders, as well
as – in the unipolar dispensation speciﬁcally – how such lines intersect with the
9Sherwood, “God of Abraham,” 320.
10Kotsko, Prince of this World, 164.
11Wojcik, End of the World.
12Runions, Babylon Complex.
13Sutton, American Apocalypse, 369–370.
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mechanisms of US imperialism. As Go outlines, the usual distinction drawn between
empires and nations is of exclusivity versus inclusivity: nations (especially civic-liberal
nations like America) ideally strive for inclusivity and equality by fostering “horizontal
comradeship” among citizens, whereas empires maintain vertical systems of hierarchiza-
tion between “citizens and subjects.” This, he argues, is a fallacy that obscures how nations
are also built on the necessary structures of exclusion that diﬀerentiate between citizens
and non-citizens, and how the borders of both categories are often constructed along
exclusionary lines, including race and gender. There is thus not empire and nation-state
but rather “empire-state.” While civic-liberal nationhood deﬁnes all persons as capable
of citizenship, it has historically policed this citizenship by categorizing only some
people as “persons” and others (women, slaves) as “property.” This is a moral but not a
structural aberration for the nation, as “the very deﬁnition and meaning of who or
what counts as a citizen in the civic community deserving of equal rights and privileges
depends upon specifying who or what does not count.”14
American citizen/subject divisions are embedded in discourses of American exception-
alism, which Donald Pease describes as a “complex assemblage of theological and secular
assumptions out of which Americans have developed the lasting belief in America as the
fulﬁllment of the national ideal to which other nations aspire.”15 Rooted in the Puritan
jeremiadic tradition, which projected a divine function for America and thus juxtaposed
a ﬂawed but ultimately correctable present to a utopic future, ideologies of exceptionalism
mediated and sublimated the gulf between the evils of America’s present and its alleged
higher calling (that is, between America as reality and America as ideal).16 The calling
that America was intended to fulﬁll has altered over time, ranging “from the City on
the Hill in the sixteenth century to the Conqueror of the World’s Market in the twenti-
eth.”17 Yet all rest on shared foundations. Jasbir Puar identiﬁes exceptionalism as “para-
doxically signal[ing] distinction from (to be unlike, dissimilar) as well as excellence
(imminence, superiority), suggesting a departure from yet mastery of linear teleologies
of progress.” This double ascription facilitates “a process whereby a national population
comes to believe in its own superiority and its own singularity.”18 For premillennial dis-
pensationalists, this singularity was linked to the apocalyptic end of the current dispensa-
tion: the United States was a product of divine creation, and during the Cold War, creative
interpretations of scripture permitted readings that gave America a chosen end times role
in combatting an atheistic, Antichristian Soviet Union.19
As David Campbell cogently demonstrates, the “geographies of evil” constructed
during the Cold War (such as Reagan’s “evil empire”) were not simply dramatizations
of realist political strategies but justiﬁed a politics of identity. They fostered a worldview
in which “enmity towards communism” consolidated a contingent identity (“America,”
“the West”) by functioning “as a code for the inscription of the multiple boundaries
between the ‘civilized’ and the ‘barbaric,’ the ‘normal’ and the ‘pathological.’”20 Such
14Go, “Myths of Nations,” 69, 71.
15Pease, New American Exceptionalism, 7–8; see also Bacevich, Limits of Power; Bercovitch, American Jeremiad.
16For a comprehensive analysis of the jeremiad and its relation to shifting ideologies of American exceptionalism, see Ber-
covitch, American Jeremiad.
17Pease, New American Exceptionalism, 7–8.
18Puar, Terrorist Assemblages, 3–5.
19Sutton, American Apocalypse, 221–225, 263–292. See also: Hartman, War for the Soul, 98; Lahr, Millennial Dreams.
20Campbell, Writing Security, 195.
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borders here allow the creation of a theologico-geopolitics that ﬁgures US empire as the
already-saved end of history, and (thus) as the bringer of world salvation. Facilitated by
the enduring myth of the reluctant superpower, by which America is spurred into
action not by self-interest but by evil,21 this theologico-geopolitics only intensiﬁed after
the USSR collapsed. In the world order given shape after 1989, the eschatological
promise of America seemed to have arrived. But as Andrew Bacevich observes, exception-
alist rhetorics imbued post-1989 US foreign policy with “an element of surrealism.”22 They
obscured realities, reinforcing narratives that protected national innocence and impeded
implementation of practical policies. Drawing on Amy Kaplan’s analysis of post-9/11
US empire, Puar argues that America used exceptionalism to evade accusations of imperi-
alism by ﬁguring a “superior United States [as] not subject to empire’s shortcomings,”
deploying claims of national moral rectitude to frame its violence as anything but imperial.
For Puar, exceptionalismmasked strategic hypocrisy, rendering America – unique yet uni-
versal – “the arbiter of appropriate ethics, human rights, and democratic behavior while
exempting itself without hesitation from such universalizing mandates.”23 As the dispen-
sation joins household to empire to cosmos, exceptionalism positions the US (as ideal, if
not reality) as the apogee of human civilization, its national polity as a metonym for
humanity, its national interests as the world’s. The fate of the nation segues into the
doom of creation.
The ﬁnal image of the dispensational triptych depicts neither the management of
household nor empire(-state) but of cosmos: God’s control over reality as the sovereign
who dispenses (with) the means of salvation. This shifts (while still maintaining) the
core binary from Go’s political distinction between citizen and subject to the theologico-
political distinction of saved (or savable) and damned (or damnable). As a unit of salvation
history, the dispensation – as Scoﬁeld wrote of that of law – has a disciplinary function; it
conditions the proper way that humans are to follow divine will, and thus diﬀerentiates
necessarily between those who follow this will and those who dissent from it. Through
analysis of oikonomia, Kotsko unpacks this disciplinary element by sketching parallels
between Christian ideas of hell and Michel Foucault’s analysis of the prison. “What is
being punished in hell as in the prison is not so much what the person has done as
what the person is,” he states. Both achieve this end by continually constituting prisoners
as what they (ostensibly) are inside, for just “as the experience of hell ensures that the
damned will remain unrepentant for all eternity, so too does the prison produce the delin-
quents on whom it exercises its disciplinary techniques.”24 In continually creating the
damned, Kotsko argues, the soteriological economy – the dispensation – justiﬁes the
necessity of its own systems. In working to form citizens of paradise, the dispensation
necessarily produces an excess – the damned – that (as with the empire-state) ensure
the status of the saved qua saved and justify the existence of the means of salvation itself.
The union of dispensationalism and exceptionalism in American premillennialist dis-
pensationism, which frames the US as the telos of history, works to conceptualize
“America” – elected by God – as the legitimate dispenser of worldly salvation. Proximity
to or distance from this America comes to symbolize one’s salvation, one’s sin. This
21For the history and relevance of this myth, see Bacevich, American Empire, 7–31.
22Bacevich, American Empire, 43.
23Ibid., 8.
24Kotsko, Prince of this World, 187, emphasis in original.
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(theo)political union of soteriology with the empire-state manifests most clearly in what
Catherine Keller termed “messianic imperialism.” Exempliﬁed in the political rhetoric
of the early war on terror, messianic imperialism casts America’s enemies as “not
merely a historical foe, but a diabolical dark force which only the white light of our [Amer-
ica’s] messianic goodness can prevail.”25 Yet, while possessing deep roots in ideologies of
US exceptionality, the conﬁguration of messianic imperialism unleashed after 9/11 was
itself dependent on the transformations inaugurated and intensiﬁed by the advent of uni-
polarity, by what Charles Krauthammer, in his 1991 Foreign Aﬀairs article of the same
name, termed “The Unipolar Moment.”
Unipolar soteriologies
Riding on the triumphalism of what George H. W. Bush called the “New World Order,”
Krauthammer announced in 1991 the arrival of “the unipolar moment in world history,”
declaring to the international system that order would be restored by “American strength
and will – the strength and will to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the
rules of world order and being prepared to enforce it.”26 This attempt to create and
enforce world order produces the soteriologies of the unipolar dispensation – ones now
being destabilized, if not dispensed with. Like those conditioned by Cold War bipolarity,
unipolarity’s soteriologies operated on two fronts, “a political and military struggle abroad
and a political and cultural struggle at home.”27 The ﬁrst is against the emergent threats to
US power in the unipolar world – notably terrorism and rogue states – the second against
the fracture of American identity itself, which had replaced images of the melting pot with
multicultural pluralism and cultural unicity with celebration of diversity. Using the heur-
istic of the dispensation, which conceptualizes dynamic interdependencies between dis-
courses of domestic, imperial, and cosmic order, this section explores how these two
fronts (de)construct one another, with the tensions between them producing intertwined
ﬁgures of damnation – states and populations that must be coerced into normativity, lest
the world crumble.
Empire for the world
In his 2000 article, “The ‘Rogue State’ Image in American Foreign Policy,” Paul D. Hoyt
demonstrates a shift in the perceptual construction of threats from the “enemy” image to
the “rogue” after the Cold War. The enemy image, epitomized by the USSR, envisions a
foe “comparable in power capability and similar in terms of cultural sophistication.”28
The rogue, by contrast, is inferior both in military capability and cultural sophistication,
framed through notions of radical asymmetry and moral lack. Having “no respect for the
international system” but unable to foster viable alternatives, the rogue prefers “to
disrupt what exists.”29 The shift from enemy to rogue, prominent in the foreign
policy of the Clinton era, encapsulates a broader post-Cold War transition from
25Keller, God and Power, 20.
26Quoted in Adib-Moghaddam, International Politics, 76.
27Bacevich, Empire, 82.
28Hoyt, ‘Rogue Image,’ 307.
29Ibid. 308
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power politics to what Miroslav Nincic terms “international deviance.” That is, global
society was/is no longer ruled by peer states “jockeying for power and position” but
by “a clash pitting most of international society, including its leading powers, against
a few actors that, their lack of conventional power notwithstanding, challenge the major-
ity’s interests and values.”30
While generally conforming to “authoritarian” political systems, such states (which
have included Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Cuba, Sudan, and former Yugoslavia) usually
have diﬀering governmental structures, legitimating ideologies, and capabilities for
action.31 Moreover, the qualities constructed as marking a rogue state – development of
WMDs; involvement in international terrorism; posing a military threat locally or globally;
challenging international norms – were never unique to those states designated such.
What unites rogue states is not structure or behaviors but “a common perception by
American policy makers”32 – speciﬁcally, a perception of having deviated from a world
order shaped by US unipolarity. This perceptual framing aligns with what Bacevich clas-
siﬁes as the main impetus of American imperium: a strategy of global openness and inte-
gration (only) under American auspices. As he demonstrates, unlike imperialisms of the
past, American empire built itself not (chieﬂy) on territorial ownership or even adminis-
trative control but on commercial access. This strategy predates unipolarity by almost a
century, but only with unipolarity and the America-led era of globalization it inaugurated
could such a strategy approach realization, or at least the perception of realization. This
perception frames the discourse of “rogue states” and galvanizes the global war on
terror that succeeded it. The concept of the “rogue state” requires a perception (not necess-
arily the reality) of a single legitimating source of authority. In introducing notions of a
global hegemon and an international constellation oriented around that hegemon, unipo-
larity creates a context in which states that fail to adhere to that system are framed as will-
fully deviant. By this, I do not mean that the actions of “rogue states” are not abhorrent
with regards to human rights, equality, or religious and political freedom, only that
their placement in post-Cold War “geographies of evil” constitutes part of broader discur-
sive and material processes of (il)legitimation.
As Andrew Preston has cogently demonstrated, religion – particularly as it fostered
and transﬁgured exceptionalist frameworks – has exerted a structuring force on Amer-
ican foreign policy throughout the nation’s history.33 Here, however, I am less interested
in how religion explicitly shaped foreign policy understandings on the rogue state than
what the heuristic rubric of the dispensation might illuminate about how the rogue state
functioned in the creation and perpetuation of particular soteriological economies.
Drawing on Kotsko’s discussion of the disciplinary function of the soteriological
economy – the dispensation – we might frame the “rogue state” in two intertwined
ways. On the one hand, it is a “savable” ﬁgure, changeable coercively through the impo-
sition of sanctions or forcibly via military intervention. On the other hand, it embodies
Keller’s already-damned “diabolical dark force,” permitting ascriptions of American
identity (and interests) as metonyms for (those of) humanity. Either way, in the (theo)-
political imaginary of the unipolar dispensation, the “rogue state” – as a discursive ﬁgure
30Nincic, Renegade Regimes, 1.
31Cameron, US Foreign Policy, 142–3; Nincic, Renegade Regimes, 12.
32Hoyt, ‘Rogue State,’ 306.
33Preston, Sword of the Spirit.
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– emerges as a threat because it is an obstacle to the realization of America’s providen-
tial empire.
The ﬁgure of “terrorism” – as a product of rogue states and in more decentralized forms
– functions similarly, perhaps even more acutely. Bacevich accurately classiﬁes the war on
terror as one “to preserve and to advance the strategy of openness,” but while he notes that
“terrorism” provided an identiﬁable enemy broadly lacking since 1989, it is crucial to note
that “terrorism” is not the enemy of Hoyt’s “enemy image” but of his “rogue,” marked by
asymmetry of arms and ascribed inferiority of culture. At the same time, the “terrorism”
conjured after 9/11 is a singular – amalgamating not merely al-Qaeda but all associated
and adjacent groups and individuals – yet highly mutable object – as America determines
who the “real” terrorists are – that while localized in speciﬁc organs (states) is metastasized
throughout the global body. Providing a rationale for the sustained use of US military
might – locally and globally – “terrorism” both epitomizes and transforms the function
of the “rogue.” Unlike the latter, which can be coerced toward salvation, terrorism
cannot be redeemed by integration into unipolarity. Rather, it is already integrated –
but as the excess of damnation. Existing in global networks of information and arms
traﬃcking, terrorism (as ﬁgure and reality) reﬂects the necropolized and necropolizing
shadow of the unipolar world, one that contests and (thereby) consolidates America’s
promised radiance.
Yet if America sought to remake the unipolar world in its own image, what this
image was acquired paramount signiﬁcance. The pursuit of unipolarity was depen-
dent on domestic identity construction – both in that rogue states and terrorism con-
solidated a narrative of national identity in relation to the world, and in that that
world in which America was attempting to coerce or cleanse such deviants took
shape from that narrative of identity. But this domestic identity was a contested
one – the nation faced a political and cultural struggle at home as much a political
and military one abroad. Bacevich frames these conﬂicts as mutually destabilizing,
and to an extent they were (and remain so) – it is perhaps indisputable that a loss
of hegemonic identity in the homeland cannot but complicate imperial impositions
of that hegemonic identity in the world at large. However, Bacevich situates this
destabilization as the result of opposite sides of the culture war winning the domestic
and international fronts of the struggle, and these sides – if radically opposed on pol-
icies – in reality utilized the same exceptionalist frameworks to frame their struggles.
As Sacvan Bercovitch unpacks, the civil rights struggles of the sixties onwards (as well
as their predecessors) drew on mythologies of “America as an unfolding prophecy,”
which “castigated the defects of the present so as to give voice to the abiding national
identity.” An absence of “inalienable rights” (tied to the nation’s founding) was
denounced through ritualistic reiterations of such rights, wherein “charges of social
abuse took the form of appeals to social ideals.”34 If both conservative and
progressive forces drew on shared (exceptionalist) mythological foundations, such
disputes over the identity of “America” should perhaps not only be seen as destabi-
lizing of imperial power but also as reinforced by – and, crucially, reinforcing of –
that power.
34Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, xiii, xvii–xviii.
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A household divided?
The history of America, Hartman diagnoses, “is largely a history of debates about the idea
of America.” In recent history, the 1960s hold a special place in these debates. They “gave
birth to a new America, a nation more open to new peoples, new ideas, new norms, and
new, if conﬂicting, articulations of America itself.” The sixties “universalized fracture,”
paving the way for a national culture that today is perhaps more divided than at “any
period since the Cold War.”35 They (re)ignited the culture wars. First used in America
to refer to the religious right’s campaign against what they saw as the indecent, subversive,
and blasphemous works of liberal artists and academics during the Reagan Presidency, the
term “culture war” was reintroduced in the early 1990s to refer to ideas that American
society had drawn itself up along opposing ideological fronts, characterized by attitudes
to homosexuality, abortion, recreational drug use, gun politics, privacy, censorship, and
church-state separation.36
One paradigmatic example of such culture war discourse came at the 1992 Republican
National Convention where former presidential candidate Pat Buchanan framed Repub-
lican opposition to Bill and Hillary Clinton as a war “for the soul of America,” one “as
critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as was the Cold War itself.” He drew a
stark divide between an America he saw as aligned with and championed by the Clintons
– characterized by “abortion on demand… homosexual rights, discrimination against
religious schools, [and] women in combat units” – and “a nation that we still call God’s
country.” Buchanan would continue this lament long after Clinton’s presidency,
opining in American Conservative on 10 July 2009, that the nation was still being trans-
formed “without the assent of her people” from “a Christian nation” rooted in a white,
European ethnos into “a multiracial, multiethnic, multilingual, multicultural Tower of
Babel” unseen since the late Roman empire.
Images of divine judgment were widely deployed in laments at the decline of normative
(white, Christian) America. In addition to that of Babel, the judgment of Sodom and
Gomorrah – long sutured exclusively to sexual activity, speciﬁcally male same-sex
relations – was especially common.37 Philosopher Leon Kass, beloved by the religious
right, framed the culture wars as a battle between “Sodom and Gomorrah and Middle-
town,” between “the values of the Bible and the values of the mass media,” which posed
the greatest challenge to American unity since the Civil War.38 Abortion and the contin-
ued growth of feminism and gay rights were ﬁgured as spearheading national descent, with
conservative religious notions that homosexuality was itself “a contagious disease” and
“sign of the end times, imagined as a plague-like epidemic threatening the entire American
body” growing in cultural inﬂuence with the AIDS crisis.39 The growth of “postmodern-
ism” and new critical methodologies such as queer and critical race theory in the academy,
as well as revaluations of the key role of black and indigenous Americans in the nation’s
history and continued oppression in its present, also unsettled old certainties about Amer-
ica’s past and position in the world. In addition, however, America’s new place in this
35Hartman, War for the Soul, 1–4.
36Hunter, Culture Wars; Hartman, War for the Soul.
37Jordan, The Invention of Sodomy.
38Quoted in Abrams, Commentary Magazine, 263.
39Long, AIDS and American Apocalypticism, 2–4.
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world also provoked adjustments in dispensationalist fears, Clinton-era globalization
reigniting fears of one world orders – fears LaHaye and Jenkin’s staggeringly successful
Left Behind series remain exemplary of, and to which I return shortly.40
As the latter elements of the conﬂict reveal, and Hartman unpacks in his history of the
culture wars, the conﬂict – waged on one side by progressive political actors aiming at
unsettling the (sexual, racial, gendered) hierarchies of normative America and on the
other by neoconservatives and religious right groups trying to sustain or restore that nor-
mativity – was not only about speciﬁc issues but also the identity (and thus purpose) of the
nation. This acquired critical focus after the Cold War’s end and its concomitant “loss of
national purpose.” Neoconservatives saw an emerging “liberal ethos” as curtailing Amer-
ica’s eﬀorts to remain the “exceptional nation among nations in the post-ColdWar world.”
Those of the religious right, meanwhile, framed this ethos as dedicated to the destruction
of the divine foundations of the nation itself. Both, however, appealed to America’s
“Judeo-Christian” foundations as oﬀering the only platform for legitimate articulations
of national identity. This conﬂict between “(Judeo-)Christian America” and a more
diverse and openly heterogeneous “Tower of Babel” ties into what Hartman diagnoses
as the “paradox of American secularization”; namely, that “religious authority dwindled
even as the vast majority of Americans doggedly persisted in religious belief.” For the
enduringly religious, loss of historical institutional privileges in areas of education, state
politics, and law appeared as a “shattering of worlds.”41
The reduction of White Protestantism’s inﬂuence challenged the centrality of Chris-
tianity to Americanism. However, while Hartman is correct in his assessment that after
the Cold War, “there was no going back” and the “culture wars were the new American
norm,”42 it is crucial to recognize Bercovitch’s insight that these attempted transform-
ations of normative America emerged chieﬂy from within its exceptionalist frameworks
rather than from outside them. While the more radical sections of the left might have
truly sought to shatter this foundation, many more (arguably the more successful) articu-
lated their grievances using the language of America’s yet-unfulﬁlled promise, demanding
recognition of their role in its history and staking a claim on its future. Hartman notes with
irony that while the America envisioned by the sixties counterculture ostensibly won, it
often did in more assimilable forms. The rise of neoliberal feminism, national and corpor-
ate pinkwashing, and what Puar cogently calls “homonationalism” – the leveraging of
growing acceptance of non-straight citizens for the purposes of US empire-building
against less tolerant (unenlightened, ergo barbaric) others – exempliﬁes this transition.
As religious right and neoconservative actors tried to restore the fractured singularity of
their America, assimilations of old antagonisms gave shape to new frontiers of exception-
alist normativity no less inherently amenable to the pursuit of unipolarity. While conser-
vative forces framed countercultural forces as tearing down America from its rightful
throne, and cultural contestations doubtlessly complicated the enforcement of unipolarity,
the truth is that the culture wars were not a conﬂict over the exceptionality of America –
merely the form that exceptionality should take, the vision of election to which other
nations should aspire, and the soteriologies that must therefore be enforced.
40See Sutton, American Apocalypse, 326–76. For a history of conservative Christian opposition to global bodies, see Ruotsila,
Christian Anti-Internationalism.
41Hartman, War for the Soul, 276, 79, 6.
42Ibid. 252.
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The international front of the unipolar dispensation grounded the possibility of salva-
tion on proximity to “America” – one’s capacity to adopt the norms America was con-
structed as embodying and (thus) facilitate American imperial interests. In order to
approximate this “America,” however, its identity had to (or at least appear to) be
stable and secured. The unipolar dispensation is thus marked by the question of and
quest for this one America. It quests after oneness, and takes place after oneness: after
oneness, as unipolarity, is possible if not present; after oneness, as cultural unicity, is shat-
tered or at least irrevocably altered. As the dispensation’s logic helps to expose, empire and
household here inﬂect one another. Yet while Bacevich situated the radiating fractures of
unicity at home as only threatening to the consolidation of unipolarity abroad, it is better
to frame them as mutually (de)constructive. A push for global openness driven by US lea-
dership and ensured by American arms required the consolidation of an identity – it
demanded one America. Which America this would be was fought on the battleﬁeld of
the culture wars. Despite otherwise irreconcilable diﬀerences, however, both sides in
this war articulated their demands in a language inherited from shared exceptionalist
foundations. Empire and household, if mutually complicating, ultimately buttressed a
blurred but nonetheless singular (and singularly exceptionalist) image of a cosmos: one
America, uniquely called (by God or History) to lead a unipolar world – even if where
to was contested.
Trumping exceptionalism
The election of Donald Trump has both clariﬁed and complicated this cosmic image.
Trump’s iconic campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” drew upon the legacy of
dispensationalist prophesying, framing its jeremiad in more secular terms but still
calling upon the core claim that the US had strayed from destiny and urgent course cor-
rection was needed. In this, Trump’s campaign exempliﬁed the ways that, as Bercovitch
detailed, the American jeremiad operates as a tool for the ritualistic control of dissent,
framing critiques of the nation within the national narrative, with its hallmarks of excep-
tionality and providence. Opposition to Trump, with its pop-culture-infused declarations
of entering the “darkest timeline” and refrains of his presidency’s abnormality, merely
reinforce Bercovitch’s insights. Framing himself as the rectiﬁer of an errant history,
Trump became (to his detractors) the marker of another. Yet despite its repetitions, the
Trump era – or dispensation – brought notable transformations relative to the soteriolo-
gies that preceded it. Most signiﬁcantly, it severed (or has attempted to sever) connections
between constructions of American uniqueness and American universality, disrupting or
perhaps even dispensing with exceptionalism itself.
Perhaps, the most deﬁnitive transition has occurred in the international sphere. The
aforementioned Politico article reﬂects this by humorously indicating the loss of US stand-
ing in the international arena. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accords and
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and Merkel and French President Emmanuel
Macron’s ensuing declaration that Europe could no longer rely on American protection
and must direct its own destiny seemingly signal an end to US unipolarity. Military
might, the strength behind America’s will, remains, but the terms of engagement have
shifted. Trump’s vow to respond to North Korea with “ﬁre and fury like the world has
never seen” if it provoked America’s wrath – rhetoric recently revived in claims that
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“total decimation” would occur without a denuclearization deal – for example, was ana-
lyzed by news outlets like MSNBC and Vox as mirroring the rhetoric of Kim Jong-un
more than of prior presidents. And while one can frame such exchanges as mere examples
of puerile machismo played out on the world stage with potentially nuclear consequences,
this eschewing of the rhetoric of humanitarianism that had categorized previous foreign
interventions also points to the way Trump’s style and substance reﬂects that of the
very “rogues” American empire was formerly constituted in contrast to.
As Nincic discusses, a nation’s status as “rogue” was often used in domestic politics of
identity: ethnonationalism or “neoteric, radical, and rage-based forms of religion” were
used to deﬁne national identity in opposition to cultural globalization and the idea that
“hostile foreign forces have undermined the community’s dignity and signiﬁcance.”43
Yet, whereas for such nations the US exempliﬁed such forces, Trump’s ethnonationalism
and the Christian nationalism of ﬁgures like Robertson and Jeﬀress use similar discourses
to cast America as similarly threatened. Trump’s stated commitment to defending “one
beautiful nation under God” at the 2017 National Prayer Breakfast and his claim on 6
July in Warsaw that the “fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the
will to survive” envisioned a model of Western, speciﬁcally American (White Christian),
identity as one whose “dignity and signiﬁcance” are besieged by “hostile foreign forces.”
The exact identities of such hostile forces shift – and signiﬁcantly so – often replicating
racist topoi long present in American public culture, whether these be the deceptiveness
and craftiness of China, or the images of terror, crime, animalistic appetites, and cultural
inassimilability used to dehumanize migrants from Africa, the Middle East, or Latin
America. Yet, while the imagery deployed to demonize these targets diﬀers, the means
by which they allegedly contravene the national body coheres around the specter of
“globalism.”
Through his campaign, Trump deployed the term to characterize the policies and
worldview of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton. As reported on 14 November 2017 by
the New York Times, then-Trump spokeswoman Hope Hicks deﬁned globalism as
putting “allegiance to international institutions ahead of the nation-state,” seeking unrest-
ricted movement of goods and people and rejecting “the principle that the citizens of a
country are entitled to preference for jobs.” The term is tied closely to conservative con-
spiracist discourses, notably that of founder of InfoWars media empire Alex Jones, with
whom Trump conducted an interview in 2015. In these discourses, globalism’s undermin-
ing of national sovereignty is linked to the undermining of the heteropatriarchal family;
asked about his view on same-sex marriage in June 2013, for example, Jones claimed
that “from the eugenicist/globalist view… they want to encourage the breakdown of the
family, because the family is where people owe their allegiance.” Generally, “globalism”
articulates anxieties of coming “one world government” or a “new world order”
(NWO) that had circulated in “Patriot” and militia circles long before Bush 41’s
(perhaps unfortunate) invocation of the phrase.44 For such groups, the NWO referred
to a shadowy international collective working to subvert US sovereignty and (in more reli-
gious variations) usher in the reign of Antichrist. As well as LayHaye and Jenkins’ ﬁctio-
nalized renditions, Robertson’s 1991 bestseller The New World Order is a noteworthy and
43Nincic, Renegade Regimes, 182, 74.
44Barkun, Culture of Conspiracy; Ruotsila, Christian Anti-Internationalism.
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inﬂuential example. Framing the 1990–1991 Gulf War – often framed as the political
instantiation of American unipolarity itself – as the ceding of US sovereignty to the
United Nations, Robertson’s text framed a “Christian United States” as necessary to
combat a coming Satanic global order.45
Externalizations of “deviant” populations via association with foreign adversaries or
transnational groups, diasporic or otherwise, are far from new – in America or
widely.46 Additionally, conjurations of “globalist” threats have deep roots in and often
replicate anti-Semitic conspiracies, with their ﬁxations on internationalism and refrains
of “international ﬁnance.”47 These are important and necessary factors to consider.
However, I here wish to discuss how the ﬁgure of “globalism” within the context of
Trump’s election works to unify domestic and international strategies of demonization
through the demonization of unipolar constructions of American universality. Globalist
conspiracies draw radical distinctions between the US government and cosmopolitan
elites – framed as in thrall to international bodies (the UN, the World Bank) and
(especially after Trump’s victory) the “Deep State” – and national sovereignty and “Real
America[n]” authenticity. This framework was typiﬁed by conspiracist and popular dis-
course around the 2016 election, with Hillary Clinton being associated with both liberal
internationalism and the rights of women, and sexual and ethnic minorities in stark oppo-
sition to Trump’s ethno-nationalism and its “America First” claims to return sovereignty
to “authentic” America. At the same time, however, the “America” here opposed to glo-
balism is shaped by the shifts in US identity wrought by the culture wars and their new
exceptionalisms. Trump’s pledge at the Republican National Convention to protect
“LGBTQ” Americans speciﬁcally from “hateful foreign ideology,” following the Orlando
nightclub shootings by ISIS-allegiant Omar Mateen, exempliﬁed post-9/11 homonational-
ism, and fed into the Islamophobic rhetoric that Trump later carried forward into presi-
dential policy-making. Various iterations of a ban on military service by transgender
people who have either transitioned or are transitioning, one part of broader transphobic
trends, highlight the geographic speciﬁcity of Trump’s pledge – and perhaps an underlying
ﬁxation on the stability and security of borders around “natural” identities, personal as
well as national.48
Trump’s campaign tapped into existing divisions drawn along gendered, racial, and
sexual lines more than it invented new ones. However, viewed through the dynamism of
the dispensational triptych, and exempliﬁed by the overarching framing of (anti-)globalism,
domestic contestations over identity should not be seen as distinct from international
implementations of US imperial power. They are discursively and materially intertwined.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, and coherent with his anti-globalism, Trump’s opportunistic homo-
nationalism drew internal borders more than external ones. And this drawing of domestic
boundaries between saved and damned is the context in which Trump’s apparent mimicry
of “rogues” must be situated. Unlike under the dispensational economies of unipolarity,
Trumpian domestic soteriologies do not relate to the mask that America shows the
45See Fitzgerald, Evangelicals. For the impact of the Gulf War on unpolarity, see Adib-Moghaddam, International Politics.
46For how minoritarian population became framed as allegiant to communities outside the nation as part of strategies of
dehumanization, see Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers.
47Barkun, Culture of Conspiracy, 126; Ruotsila, Christian Anti-Internationalism, 40–41, 124, 175.
48For links between transphobia, border securitization, and administrative violence, particularly in relation to homonation-
alism and pinkwashing, see Dean Spade, Normal Life.
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world, the self-image of that “indispensable nation” against which others are judged and to
which they are intended to aspire. This shattering of self-image should not be seen as simple
isolationism – long a favored bugbear of those pushing America’s exceptional position on
the world stage49 – even if those new frontiers of the culture wars display shared ﬁxations
on national and bodily borders that shape the identity of damned subjects, who will be
shielded only from “foreign” ideologies and excluded from the main institution that still
enforces US power. Despite the isolationist tones of “America First” and contrary campaign
comments, Trump’s presidency has shown a strong preference for unilateralism, with per-
sistent admiration for military power and little hesitation over armed intervention, in either
prospect (North Korea) or practice (Syria).
Reading the domestic reconﬁgurations of this Trumpian dispensation through the
international ones reveals less a retreat from the world than a retreat from exceptionalism
as previously deﬁned. It severs the bond between American exceptionalism’s twin claims
to uniqueness and universality, maintaining the nation’s singularity – its exceptionality as
distinction – by shedding its ostensibly universal nature – its exceptionality as excellence.
The soteriologies of unipolarity – drawing on and actualizing older traditions of American
exceptionalism – were grounded in “America” as a metonym for the world and Americans
as one of humanity. The new dispensation sketches its borders more sharply. Its deﬁnition
of “who the American are” – of who they can be – is more circumscribed. In a sense, this
circumscription merely exacerbates and exposes tensions present within the unipolar dis-
pensation’s soteriologies, which were always built on the empire-state’s oft-disavowed dis-
tinction between the already-saved citizens and teeming masses of savable, damnable, and
already-damned subjects. Yet, it also dispenses with the promise of universality on which
unipolarity’s soteriologies were justiﬁed. More than a mere slip of the mask of exception-
alism from the face of empire – although it is this – this emerging soteriology ﬁgures
America itself as having become damned (or at least damnable) precisely because of its
universalizing aspirations, politically and ethically. Framed thus, it is not that this Trum-
pian soteriology refuses redemptive or regenerative language – his pledge to return the
nation to greatness, to save ailing (and increasingly circumscribed) people from “Ameri-
can carnage” – as Trump’s inauguration speech had it – shows otherwise. It is that the
carnage from which it seeks to save them might just be exceptionalism itself.
Closure
The current crisis over American identity ﬁgured by the 2016 election is part of a broader
crisis tied to soteriological tensions inaugurated by US unipolarity. At once religious and
political, this crisis emerges around anxieties over the correct path to salvation for the
citizen-subjects of US empire. Framing this crisis through the heuristic of a “unipolar dis-
pensation,” I argued that the globalization of “America” after the Cold War founded an
unstable soteriological economy in which salvation was aligned with an American-ness
that was itself ceaselessly (and necessarily) contested. In this framework, domestic culture
wars – especially with the loss of the consolidating enemy image of the Soviet Union – rep-
resented the battleground for an American identity and normativity which other and
othered nations might approximate. Cultivation – by agreement, coercion, invasion – of
49See Bacevich, American Empire, 72.
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this identity in such others constituted part of the strategy of openness, the means by which
the rapidly globalizing world would be made (accessible to) America. Sublimation of Amer-
ica’s increasingly acknowledged diﬀerences – exempliﬁed, in the context of race, by Clinton’s
“One America,” but also applicable to sexuality, gender, ethnicity, religion – is here necessary
for the consolidation of a global imperium premised on others’ ability to approximate the
hegemon’s self-image. As such, mutual (de)constructions of unicity and unipolarity gave
shape to the soteriological economy of the unipolar dispensation.
Donald Trump’s election complicates this soteriological economy, representing in
diﬀerent measures both the end of unipolarity’s soteriologies and an end to which they
have led. His presidency has unsettled the divisions between exceptionalism and empire
that unipolarity relied on and thereby destabilizes exceptionalist visions of the nation as
grounded in its ethical and political excellence – its exemplary universality. In both rheto-
ric and policy, the trumping of the old dispensation seeks to dispense with unipolarity and
the soteriological frameworks it represented, which were premised on ideas of global open-
ness and American leadership and moral superiority (however illusory or disingenuous
such claims may have been). Yet, this qualiﬁer begs a return to Sinykin’s reading of
Trump’s dispensationalist supporters: was Trump’s election truly the “rapture?” Has it
inaugurated a new dispensation, the soteriologies of which supersede the prior, or
merely laid bare tensions within existing soteriologies?
The answer is a complex one. The structuring power of the jeremiad in American
culture will endure – and in this context, it is noteworthy that opposition to Trump
(both left and right) often returns to the language of exceptionalism, lamenting the abdi-
cation of world leadership and concomitant loss of preeminence. But a desire to return
does not necessarily enable one. The rise of new poles of global power (China) and desta-
bilization of old alliances (Europe) make restorations of (American) unipolarity implau-
sible at best. Thus, even if domestic conﬂicts over national identity are resolved (a
prospect perhaps more implausible, given historical patterns and present realities), this
resolution would lack its prior imperial salience (persistent military might notwithstand-
ing).50 It is this lack which signals the dispensing of the unipolar dispensation. This is not
to argue that the question of and quest for one America – in the twenty-ﬁrst century or
beyond – will not continue creating new soteriologies, including exceptionalist ones.
Nor is it to claim that such a struggle is not of paramount importance. The struggles of
those that the new dispensation attempts to cast as damned subjects to legitimize the sal-
vation of its citizens of paradise will shape and reshape its soteriologies, as others did
before them. It is simply to posit that with the crisis and collapse of a unipolar world,
one America – whichever (if ever) it might be – may be only that, and nothing more.
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